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Abstract* 
This paper uses an National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
1995 data set to examine the concentration of property and liability insurance 
by line of insurance in the U.S. The primary measure of concentration used is 
the Herfindahl index. The largest 100 affiliates are divided into three largest 
sets of 20, 30, and 50. We find that the homeowners line is the most concen-
trated line and commercial auto physical damage is the least concentrated line, 
with the top 20 affiliates commanding the largest between-set and within-set 
contributions. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Ng (1995) has observed that structure, conduct, and performance 
are key elements in comprehending the organization of any industry, a 
view shared by Adams and Brock (1995) in their survey of 11 major U.S. 
industries. But while the economics literature is rich in the study of the 
industrial organization of a majority of businesses in the U.S., loskow 
(1973) has noted a lack of such research in the U.S. insurance industry. 
loskow attempts to rectify by addressing organizational issues such as 
business concentration, economies of scale, and ease of entry. 
Mayers and Smith (1988) address the issue of the alternative owner-
ship characteristics of property and casualty insurance, indicating that 
Lloyds, common stock, mutual, and reciprocal are the main types of 
ownership. Cummins and Weiss (1991) wrote a seminal paper on the 
subject addressing recent problems of property and liability insurance 
such as pricing, rate regulation, anticompetitive practices, market con-
centration, and profitability. More recent contributions are provided by 
Chidambaran et al., (1997) and Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita (1998). 
An important facet of an industry'S structure is concentration. Con-
centration depicts the level of control of an industry by a few domi-
nant firms. For instance, Chidambaran et al., (1997) find that among 
18 lines of insurance, concentration levels in private passenger auto-
mobile insurance are the highest. Similarly, Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita 
(1998) examine the relationship between profitability and concentration 
in automobile insurance. The underlying focus of the research in these 
papers is the connection of concentration with excess profits through 
collusion to restrict supply and thus gain artificially high premiums. 
Another way to look at concentration 1 is to take into account the 
relationship between concentration and corporate demand for insur-
ance, an approach exemplified by Mayers and Smith (1982, 1990). They 
explain that though the demand for insurance by individuals demon-
strates risk aversion, the incentives to purchase insurance by corpora-
tions, aside from risk averSion, are viewed as being part of finanCing 
policies, which include taxes and contracting costs. They also show 
that among the factors that affect the demand for insurance are busi-
ness concentration, geographic concentration, and line of bUSiness. 
IThe authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for this viewpoint 
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1.2 Insurance Regulation 
To protect against erosion and subversion of competition in the U.S., 
Congress passed a series of laws to protect consumers. Lereah (1985) 
explains that 1944 marked a reversal in regulation of insurance pre-
miums, as a consequence of a Supreme Court decision, from primar-
ily regulation by states to federal regulation as well when insurance is 
transacted across state borders. Subsequently, insurers became subject 
to antitrust regulation through federal laws such as the Sherman and 
Clayton Antitrust Acts. Through the McCarren-Ferguson Act of 1945, 
however, Congress allowed priority for regulation to the states unless 
effective state regulation was absent. For more on the regulation of in-
surance companies, see, for example, Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 
34), and Hamilton (1997). 
The insurance industry in the last two decades has been accused 
of price-fixing and anticompetitive and monopoly practices, which may 
deserve attention by the federal government (Joskow and McLaughlin 
1991, Chidambaran et al. 1997, Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita 1998). It is 
an article of faith among most economists that substantial seller con-
centration affects the social performance of an industry to the detri-
ment of consumers (Caves 1967, Schutz 1995).2 Brown (1914) made 
it clear that the tendency toward monopoly and the tendency toward 
concentration are closely interrelated. Weiss (1983) and Adams and 
Brock (1990) argue that bigness undermines performance, effiCiency, 
innovation, and technical progress. Scherer and Ross (1990) provide a 
comprehensive picture for the proposition that monopoly prices reduce 
economic welfare due to distortions to efficiency that can be amplified 
through successive vertical stages of output. Wenders (1987) indicates 
also that part of the gains from monopoly power are dissipated into 
higher wages in addition to higher profits. 
Costs under monopoly conditions may also be excessive because 
cost controls become lax and wasteful expenditures to strengthen and 
defend monopoly positions proliferate. Advertising, excessive product 
variety, and excessive government regulation costs compound further 
the decline in economic welfare due to concentration. Other dimen-
sions of the impact of concentration on performance mentioned by 
Scherer and Ross include the possibility of redistribution of income 
2Not all economists agree that control of a large share of a market by a few firms is 
necessarily bad. For instance, Brozen (1982) takes the view that bigness is the reward 
for efficiency. Concentration is indicative of a movement away from high-cost firms 
toward lower-cost, more efficient firms. 
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benefiting the shareholders and, to a certain extent, institutional in-
vestors. 
1.3 Aim and Purpose 
The property and liability insurance industry is composed roughly 
of 3,000 companies and about 40 major lines of property and liability in-
surance. Many of these companies deal with mul tiple lines of insurance. 
There is a great deal of affiliation among these companies, resulting in 
approximately 800 affiliations or groups. The individual companies in a 
group have considerable autonomy. Joint directorships and ownership 
of a group make it appropriate to consider an insurance group as one 
firm when investigating the questions of concentration. According to 
Huebner, Black, and Webb (1996), the affiliates had combined admitted 
assets3 of $571.5 billion in 1993. Most of the affiliates operate in more 
than one state, and a substantial number operate nationwide. 
A distinction is made between industry concentration where a few 
sellers dominate a specific market and aggregate concentration where 
a few conglomerate firms control large chunks of an economy. A con-
glomerate controls many lines of business. The lines mayor may not be 
associated with high concentration. Nissan (1996) provides an assess-
ment of aggregate concentration in the property and liability insurance 
for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993 for the largest 200 firms. The main 
finding of Nissan's work is a slight increase in aggregate concentration 
between 1985 and 1993 that is most pronounced among the top 20 
firms. 
While Nissan's concern is concentration on an aggregate basis, irre-
spective of the line of insurance, this paper takes Nissan's research a bit 
further: it provides an assessment of the degree of concentration by the 
major lines of property and liability insurance in the most recent year 
of data availability. The paper compares the degree of concentration 
among the major lines under consideration. Our focus is on concentra-
tion for 12 lines (as indicated in Tables 2 to 4) and we deal only with the 
largest 100 firms (affiliates) in each line (from Table 5 onward). Also, 
comparisons with previous studies on concentration are made. The 
analysis is conducted for all the affiliates in a line of insurance as well 
as by sets of hundreds. 
3 Admitted assets encompass all assets not prohibited by statute or regulation and 
include cash and bank deposits, real estate, mortgage loans', stocks, bonds, and other 
assets. 
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1.4 Database and Data Handling 
The data used in this research were obtained from the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The association has existed 
some 125 years. The NAIC (1998) publication furnishes a brief synop-
sis of the extent and type of information gathered from some 5,500 of 
such insurance companies as life and health, property and liability, and 
the like. The data collected by NAIC account for 98 percent of all U.S. 
domiciled insurance companies. 
This research benefits from the electronic company listing way of 
handling the data. The company listing for the property and liability 
insurance provides information on all member insurance companies 
including company name, company type (line), state of domicile, NAIC 
group code, and NAIC company code. 
Because the data were provided in a disaggregated form covering 
some 40 different lines of insurance, it was necessary to undertake a 
massive effort to aggregate the 5,500 data points of the 40 lines in each 
state into a manageable number of groups of companies (affiliates or 
firms) which are then used as the database for this research. Through-
out the rest of this paper the term affiliates or firms will denote a group 
of companies. 
A note about economic data is in order. In economics one can only 
obtain a single realization (sample) of the economic process as we can-
not stop the economy and restart the economic process to produce a 
new realization. Economists view the values obtained from that single 
realization as random values in the sense that if a new realization un-
der the same conditions can be obtained, one would almost certainly 
not obtain identical numerical values. In fact, Darnell and Evans (1990, 
p. 25) state that 
It is our argument that any economic data may be conceived 
as being a random sample from a hypothetical population, 
and that this implies certain testable properties of the data 
which contribute to the design of the framework of data anal-
ysis. 
Similar observations regarding economic data were made by others; see, 
for example, Griliches (1985) and McCloskey (1985). 
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2 Measurements 
2.1 Measures of Concentration 
There are two types of measures of concentration: static measures 
and dynamic measures (TschoegI1982). Static measures of concentra-
tion include the concentration ratio (eRn) of market share of the n 
largest firms and weighted measures of the form 
N 
Ch = L h(Zi)Zi 
i=l 
(1) 
where N is the number of firms in the market; Zi 2':: 0 is the market 
share of the ith firm in the total amount, with L Zi = 1; and h(Zi) is a 
nonnegative weight function; see ]acquemin and Kumps (1971). In this 
paper we take Zi as the share (proportion) of premiums written by firm 
i. 
The weighted measures will differ depending on the selection of 
h(·). Two common weighted concentration measures are the Herfind-
ahl index (where h(Zi) = Zi), and Theil's entropy (where h(zd = -In(zi)). 
Another static measure suggested by Kwoka (1977) is the dominance 
index D given by 
N-l 
D = L (Z(i) - Z(i+1)2 
i=l 
where z(i) is the market share of the ith largest firm, i.e., z(i) 2':: Z(i+l). 
For this measure the emphasis is on the gaps between successive firms 
when they are ranked by size. 
The concentration ratio is simple to construct, easy to understand, 
and hence widely used according to Hannah and Kay (1977). The choice 
of n is arbitrary. Typically, n is chosen as the largest four firms, eight 
firms, ten firms, 20 firms, or 50 firms. The Herfindahl is the most popu-
lar (Scherer and Ross 1990). The various static measures of concentra-
tion, however, are highly correlated, as indicated by Scherer and Ross 
(1990). 
The dynamic measures, on the other hand, reflect the change in 
size of firms over a time period. An example of a dynamic measure, 
as pointed out by Tschoegl, is the index of market share instability 
developed by Hymer and Pashigian (1962). This index takes the form 
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N-l 
1= L Izi,t - Zi,t-21 
i=l 
where Zi,t is the ith firm's market share at time t. If a firm is not in the 
top 100 or 20 (depending on the market considered), at either time t or 
t - 2, the market share for that time period is set to zero. A greater de-
gree of change over the period (taken here as 2 years) induces a higher 
value for the index I, which implies a greater competitive turbulence 
and a greater amount of entry and exit of firms. Other dynamic mea-
sures are derived from standard stochastic growth models which take 
into account any first-order serial correlation in growth rates. 
This paper uses two static concentration indexes to compare the 
concentration levels by line of insurance: the concentration ratio and 
the Herfindahl index, H 
N N 
H = L ZiZi = L zi- (2) 
i=l i=l 
When one firm holds all shares, H = 1. When shares are held equally, 
H = liN. Thus liN :s: H :s: 1. The Herfindahl index is used in 
merger guidelines by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and 
the Federal Trade Commission in merger and monopolization cases. 
The Herfindahl index also has a wide appeal among economists, ac-
cording to Clarke and Davies (1983), because of its origins in economic 
theory and history. 
For a concentration index Ch, as expressed by equation (2), a concept 
known as numbers equivalent, Mh, provides an intuitive understanding 
of the extent of concentration. Specifically, Mh is the number of equally 
sized firms that will produce the given concentration index. For Mh 
firms, Zi = 1/Mh, for i = 1,2, ... ,Mh, so that 
If h is invertible, then 
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1 
Mh == h- 1 (Ch)' (3) 
For the Herfindahl, Ch == Hand h -1 == h so that 
(4) 
The interpretation of MH is that for the Herfindahl index for the N 
firms each with market share 1/ N, the index value will correspond to 
MH equally sized firms. 
2.2 Variance and Herfindahl Decompositions 
Suppose the N firms in a line can be placed into G distinct sets 
for comparison purposes among the lines, and the sets are labeled 
1,2, ... ,G. Each line is composed of a number of affiliates or firms. 
Let Ag denote the set of indices in the 9th set for a given line. The ith 
firm is in Ag if and only if i E A g. We assume that each firm appears in 
exactly one and only one set. The total variance and the square of the 
coefficient of variation of the ZiS are S2 and Cy2 respectively where 
(5) 
and 
(6) 
with 
Standard results of a statistical analysis of variance (ANOYA) shows that 
the variance can be decomposed into a between sets sum of the squares 
and a within sets sum of the squares.4 The variance can be decomposed 
as 
4For more on ANOVA see, for example, Scheffe (1959, Chapter 3) or Neter, Wasser-
man, and Craig (1990, Chapters 14). 
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G N 
5 2 '" g(- -)2 = L - Zg-Z 
g=l N 
Between Sets 
G 
'" Ng '" 1 2 + L .L N(Zi - 2g) 
g=l tEAg 9 
Within Sets. 
where N g is the number of firms in Ag and 2g = LiEA zi/Ng. 9 
97 
(7) 
Theil (1967) shows that CY2 can be decomposed similarly into the 
between-set squared coefficient of variation, which measures between-
set concentration, and the within-set squared coefficients of variation, 
which measures concentration between firms within a given set. Let 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
and 
Hg = L zf. (13) 
iEAg 
It follows that 
(14) 
and 
G N 
-2CY2 = -2Cy2 '" --.!l.. -2cy 2 Z Z + L N Zg g, 
g=l 
(15) 
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which implies, 
CY2 = Cy2 Between Sets Squared CY 
G N 22 
+ '" -ll-IiCY 2 L N 22 9 
g=1 
Within Sets Squared CY. (16) 
There is a relationship between Hand CY. Clarke (1985) shows that 
Cy2 = N xH-1. 
It immediately follows that 
which implies, 
G -2 
_ '" N g Zg N H - 1 = GH - 1 + L N 22 (NgHg - 1) 
g=1 
G - ~ Ng 2~ 
H = N H + L N2 22 (NgHg - 1). 
g=1 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
It is also useful to test the equality of variances and by implication 
the equality of the Herfindahl measures for the various pairs of lines of 
insurance by the test statistic: 
F* _ sf 
- 2 Sj (20) 
where k is the number of firms in one line and j is the number of firms in 
another line, and sf and SJ are the variances computed from equation 
(11). (As there are 12 lines, there will be 66 (= 12!/(2!l0!) different 
pairs of tests.) The test statistic F* is compared for Significance with 
a tabular F* «(X, nk-l. nj-d for Significance level (X with nk-1 and nj-1 
degrees of freedom, reflecting the number of firms in the two lines of 
insurance under consideration. 
3 Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the total premium written of ap-
proximately $271 billion in 1995 among the major lines of property 
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and liability insurance, listed in order of magnitude from the largest 
to the smallest. The private passenger auto liability line, with approxi-
mately $60 billion of business accounting for 21.6 percent of the total, 
is the largest. The various lines of automobile insurance (private and 
commercial) together account for 44.2 percent of the total. Workers 
compensation with 12.3 percent and homeowners multiple peril with 
9.3 percent are the next two largest lines. 
Even though some of the lines contribute a small percentage to the 
total, such as fire (1.9 percent) and allied (1.3 percent), they command 
large dollar amounts. For the fire line, premium written is over $ 5 
billion. For the allied line, the premium written is almost $4 billion. 
Table 2 provides the distribution of premiums written for various 
years for the ten largest lines, which constitute almost 90 percent of the 
total. It shows that the percentages, with the exception of a slight in-
crease in private passenger auto liability, remained virtually unchanged 
between 1981 and 1995. 
Table 3 provides the extent to which property and liability insur-
ance is dominated by the largest four, ten, and 50 firms for 1989 and 
1995 as measured by the aggregate shares and the concentration ra-
tio (eRn). For private passenger auto liability damage for instance, the 
largest four, ten, and 50 firms in 1989 have shares of 43.2 percent, 56.6 
percent, and 85.6 percent, respectively. For 1995, the corresponding 
percentages are 47.2,62.2, and 88.4. 
Another line of insurance that demonstrates large increases in con-
centration for the largest groups of companies is homeowners insur-
ance where for the top four, ten, and 50 firms the respective concentra-
tions for 1989 are 39.5 percent, 52.7 percent, and 82.1 percent. These 
concentrations increase in 1995 to 47.0 percent, 61.3 percent, and 87.7 
percent. The other lines of insurance in Table 3 demonstrate, in general, 
similar increases in percentages between 1989 and 1995. 
O'Neill (1996) provides data on aggregate concentration in non-man-
ufacturing sectors in 1987: the largest 50 firms in banking held 48.3 
percent of assets; in life insurance, the top 50 firms controlled 70 per-
cent of assets and 48 percent of written premiums; for electric and gas 
utilities, the largest 40 firms controlled 64.5 percent of assets; and for 
retail trade and transportation, the top 50 firms controlled 23.0 percent 
and 74.0 percent of assets, respectively. 
Table 1 
Premiums Distributions of Property and liability by line of Insurance 
Type of Insurance Total ($1000s) % of Total 
Other Private Passenger Auto Liability 59,932,460 21.6 
Private Passenger Auto Physical Damage 37,435,637 13.5 
Workers Compensation 34,139,204 12.3 
Homeowners Multiple Peril 25,846,863 9.3 
Other Liability 22,512,579 8.1 
Other Commercial Auto Liability 13,163,519 4.7 
Commercial Multiple Peril (Non-Liability Portion) 11,176,538 4.0 
Commercial Multiple Peril (Liability Portion) 9,777,047 3.5 
Private Passenger Auto No-Fault (Personal Injury Protection) 7,491,338 2.7 
Inland Marine 6,917,010 2.5 
Medical Malpractice 6,164,639 2.2 
Fire 5,350,244 1.9 
Group Accident and Health 5,218,269 1.9 
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 4,750,182 1.7 
Allied Lines 3,734,984 1.3 
Aggregate Write-Ins for Other Lines of Business 2,993,766 1.1 
Surety 2,734,916 1.0 
Product Liability 2,262,510 0.8 
Ocean Marine 2,127,036 0.8 
Mortgage Guaranty 2,076,288 0.7 
Source: NAIC (1998) and calculations by the authors. 
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Table 1 (Contd.) <: <::;. 
Premiums Distributions of Property and liability by Une of Insurance '" t"l 
Type of Insurance Total ($1000s) % of Total ~ t"l 
Aircraft (All Perils) 1,395,441 0.5 ~ ~ 
Farm Owners Multiple Peril 1,331,496 0.5 ~ 
Earthquake 1,277,090 0.5 ~ ~ 
Other Accident Only 1,258,281 0.5 -;::; 
All Other A & H 1,105,694 0.4 Q 
Multiple Peril 956,723 0.3 ~ C"\ (\) 
Fidelity 954,182 0.3 ~ ..... 
Financial Guaranty 818,348 0.3 ~ g. 
Boiler and Machinery 786,604 0.3 ~ 
Guaranteed Renewable A & H 521,741 0.2 ~. 
Credit 374,237 0.1 ~ .... 0 
Nonrenewable for Stated Reasons Only 365,709 0.1 ~ (\) 
Commercial Auto No-Fault (Personal Injury Protection) 358,268 0.1 .... ..... 
" Credit A & H (Group and Individual) 312,622 0.1 Qo 
r-
Federal Employees Health Benefit Premium 250,048 0.1 !is. 
Burglary and Theft 132,264 0.0 ~ ;::;: 
Collectively Renewable A & H 51,156 0.0 
" r-Glass 15,251 0.0 ~. 
(\) 
Noncancelable A & H 2,679 0.0 '" 
TOTAL 278,072,881 100.0 
,.... 
Source: NAIC (1998) and calculations by the authors. 0 ,.... 
Table 2 
Premiums Distributions of Property and liability 
By Major line of Insurance (Percent of Total, in %) 
Line of Insurance 1981 1985 1989 1992 1995 
Private Passenger Auto Liability 19.1:) 193 
Private Auto Physical Damage 14.1 14.5 
Commercial Auto Liability 4.8 5.4 
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 2.7 2.8 
Homeowners ll.5 9.6 
Fire and Allied 5.1 4.3 
Commercial Multiple Peril 6.9 8.3 
General Liability 6.1 7.9 
Medical Malpractice 1.3 2.0 
Workers Compensation 14.7 ll.8 
Other 13.0 14.1 
Total Premiums ($ billions) 99.3 146.1 
L1.1 
14.2 
5.8 
2.5 
8.5 
3.4 
8.4 
8.8 
2.1 
13.6 
11.6 
208.4 
LO.S 
13.2 
5.1 
1.7 
8.6 
2.9 
7.3 
7.9 
2.1 
15.7 
15.0 
247.9 
21.6 
13.5 
4.7 
1.7 
9.3 
3.2 
7.5 
8.1 
2.2 
12.3 
15.9 
278.7 
Sources: 1981, 1985, and 1989 entries (Cummins and Weiss 1991); 1992 and 1995 entries are 
calculated by the authors from NAIC (1998). 
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Table 3 ~ ::; 
Concentration Ratios for Premiums Written >:l.. 
By Property and liability Insurance (Selected Years) ~ (§ 
Top 4 Firms Top 10 Firms Top 50 Firms ::; 
Line of Insurance 1989 1995 1989 1995 1989 1995 ":'; Q Private Passenger Auto Liability 43.2 47.2 56.6 62.2 85.6 88.4 ::; 
Private Auto Physical Damage 41.8 46.7 53.9 60.2 80.4 85.7 r. ~ ::; 
Commercial Auto Liability 19.6 20.6 38.1 37.9 80.9 81.4 .... ~ 
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 19.6 18.9 35.0 35.3 78.0 81.3 .... o· 
Homeowners 39.5 47.0 52.7 61.3 82.1 87.7 ::; ~. 
Fire [18.9] 30.0 [36.3] 45.3 [73.9] 83.0 
"\J 
Allied 22.7 43.3 82.9 d 
"I::s 
Commercial Multiple Peril [21.8] 24.2 [43.1] 45.1 [85.9] 87.7 ~ ..... 
.... 
Commercial Multiple Peril (Liability) 28.3 49.1 88.9 " S2I> 
General Liability 32.6 40.0 51.9 59.8 84.5 88.6 r-
Medical Malpractice 32.0 37.0 52.3 62.7 2.4 99.8 SS· g 
Workers Compensation 26.7 28.4 49.2 50.3 88.4 87.3 ;:;: 
" r-Sources: 1989 entries (Cummins and Weiss 1991); 1995 entries are calculated by the authors ~. 
from NAIC (1998). ~ 
'" 
'""' 0 
w 
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Table 4 
Herfindahl Index of Concentration for Premiums 
Written by Major Property and liability Insurance (All Affiliates) 
Line of Insurance 1989 1995 CY2 MH 
Private Passenger Auto Liability 0.0650 0.0836 7.36 11.96 
Private Auto Physical Damage 0.0676 0.0850 7.50 11.76 
Commercial Auto Liability 0.0214 0.0218 1.18 45.87 
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 0.0313 0.0203 1.03 49.26 
Homeowners 0.0573 0.0882 7.82 11.34 
Fire [0.0149] 0.0365 2.65 27.40 
Allied 0.0268 1.68 37.31 
Commercial Multiple Peril [0.0263] 0.0293 1.93 34.13 
Commercial Multiple Peril (Liability) 0.0359 2.59 27.86 
General Liability 0.0450 0.0674 5.74 14.84 
Medical Malpractice 0.0364 0.0574 4.74 17.42 
Workers Compensation 0.0364 0.0331 2.31 30.21 
Sources: 1989 entries (Cummins and Weiss, 1991). 
1995 entries are calculated by the authors from NAIC (1998) 
In contrast, the top 50 companies in property and liability insur-
ance (Table 3) controlled much larger shares in premium written, rang-
ing between 81.3 percent for commercial auto physical damage to 99.8 
percent for medical malpractice in 1995. For 1989, the corresponding 
range is between 78 percent and 88.4 percent. 
Table 4 provides the Herfindahl index of concentration for all af-
filiates for 1989 and 1995 and the numbers equivalent for 1995. The 
Herfindahl index is calculated using equation (1), Cy2 is calculated using 
equation (3), and the numbers equivalent is calculated using equation 
(2). MH = 49.26 is the largest and MH = 11.76 is the smallest among 
the equally sized firms. In contrast to the insurance industry, for in-
stance, Adams and Brock (1995) report that the U.S. crude oil market 
had in 1991 a Herfindahl index of 0.02894, corresponding to MH = 36. 
The concentration index increased noticeably between 1989 and 
1995 in almost all lines of property and liability insurance. The most 
noticeable increase, from 0.0650 in 1989 to 0.0850 in 1995, is for the 
private passenger auto physical damage line. The only slight decrease 
in concentration, from 0.0364 in 1989 to 0.0331 in 1995, is for the 
workers compensation line. 
Table 5 
Dollar Magnitudes of Premium Written 
By Top 100 Affiliates and Proportions by Sets for 1995 
Line 
Codes Total Set 1 
Private Passenger Auto Liability 1 54,312,023,302 0.756 
Private Auto Physical Damage 2 33,635,781,692 0.754 
Workers Compensation 3 26,326,667,644 0.674 
Homeowners 4 23,412,901,987 0.765 
General Liability 5 20,476,334,144 0.774 
Commercial Auto Liability 6 11,848,100,515 0.582 
Commercial Multiple Peril 7 10,115,152,209 0.694 
Commercial Multiple Peril (Liability) 8 8,949,287,219 0.705 
Fire 9 4,402,251,361 0.663 
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 10 4,233,965,153 0.569 
Medical Malpractice 11 3,560,398,869 0.848 
Allied 12 3,338,366,360 0.665 
Notes: Set 1 (top 20 affiliates), Set 2 (next 30 affiliates), and Set 3 (bottom 50 affiliates). 
Sources: NAIC (1998) and calculations by the authors. 
Set 2 Set 3 
0.149 0.095 
0.150 0.095 
0.226 0.100 
0.151 0.085 
0.148 0.078 
0.281 0.137 
0.218 0.088 
0.212 0.083 
0.223 0.114 
0.293 0.138 
0.149 0.002 
0.208 0.127 
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4 Comparing the Top 100 Affiliates 
4.1 Defining the Sets 
Because the top 100 affiliates in each line command the larges t share 
of premium written and to make the comparison for concentration 
among the lines meaningful, the analysis for 1995 will concentrate on 
the premiums written by the top 100 affiliates for each line. Also, in 
order to take advantage of the disaggregation procedure of equation 
(16) whereby the total Cy2 can be split into a between-set component 
and within-set component, the top 100 affiliates are grouped into the 
top 20 affiliates (Set 1), the next 30 affiliates (Set 2), and the remaining 
50 affiliates (Set 3). 
Table 5 provides a dollar amount summary of the 100 affiliates of 
the largest 12 lines arranged from the largest magnitude to the smallest. 
Coding facilitates comparisons and analysis. The table reveals that the 
top 20 affiliates of each line control a substantial proportion of premi-
ums written, ranging from 0.569 for commercial auto physical damage 
to 0.848 for medical malpractice. 
4.2 Decomposition Results 
The results of the computations from equation (16) for the top 100 
affiliates, whereby the square of the coefficient of variation is decom-
posed into between-set and within-set components, are shown in Tables 
6 and 7.5 Tables 6 and 7 arrange the lines of the top 100 affiliates ac-
cording to their 52 and by implication by Cy2 magnitude. Thus, the 
homeowners line (code 4) at Cy2 = 8.60 is the most concentrated line. 
The least concentrated line at Cy2 = 1.28 is recorded by the commercial 
auto physical damage line (code 10). 
The total CY2 from equation (16) is decomposed into the between-
set and within-set components then expressed as totals in Table 6 and 
as proportions in Table 7. Thus, for the homeowners line, the total 
CY2 = 8.60 is split into between-set concentration of a total amount 
2.00 and within-set concentration of a total amount 6.60, translated 
into respective proportions in the amounts 0.233 and 0.767. 
SNote that we are not using analysis of variance to test between and within sets of 
firms in a given line. This disaggregation was made only to produce Tables 6 and 7. 
We are only testing for equality of total variances of two lines at a time; each line is 
composed of 100 firms. 
;z: 
i;;' 
v, 
s;) 
::s 
s;) 
::s 
Table 6 s::t. 
Decomposition of Total CV2 of the Top 100 Affiliates ~ 
Between Sets Within Sets ~ ::s 
Line Code Total Set! Set 2 Set 3 Total Set! Set 2 Set 3 Total ':'S 
Homeowners 4 8.60 1.59 0.07 0.34 2.00 6.58 0.01 0.00 6.60 ~ ::s 
Private Passenger APD 2 8.44 1.54 0.07 0.33 1.94 6.50 0.00 0.00 6.50 C") (\) 
::s 
Private Passenger Ai 1 7.36 1.54 0.08 0.33 1.95 5.40 0.01 0.00 5.41 ..... ~ General Liability 5 6.30 1.65 0.08 0.36 2.09 4.21 0.01 0.00 4.21 g. 
Fire 9 3.15 1.07 0.02 0.30 1.39 1.74 0.02 0.01 1.76 ::s 
Medical Malpractice 11 2.84 1.01 0.20 0.25 1.46 1.37 0.02 0.00 1.38 ~. 
." 
Commercial MPL 8 2.82 1.27 0.03 0.35 1.65 1.14 0.03 0.00 1.17 ~ 
Workers Compensation 3 2.51 1.12 0.02 0.32 1.46 1.03 0.01 0.01 ~ 1.05 (\) 
"" Commercial MP 7 2.18 1.22 0.02 0.34 1.58 0.57 0.03 0.00 0.60 ..... 
'" Allied 12 1.98 1.08 0.02 0.28 1.38 0.57 0.02 0.01 0.60 
QI> 
r-
Commercial AL 6 1.45 0.73 0.00 0.26 0.99 0.42 0.02 0.01 0.45 SS· ~ Commercial APD 10 1.28 0.68 0.00 0.26 0.94 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.34 ::;: 
'" Notes: APD = Auto Physical Damage, Ai = Auto Liability, MPL = Multiple Peril (Liability), MP = Multiple Peril. r-~. 
(\) 
V, 
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'-J 
,.... 
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00 
Table 7 
Proportional Decomposition of Total CV2 of the Top 100 Affiliates 
Between Sets Within Sets 
Line Code Total Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Total Setl Set 2 Set 3 Total 
Homeowners 4 1.00 0.185 0.008 0.040 0.233 0.765 0.001 0.000 0.767 
Private Passenger APD 2 1.00 0.182 0.009 0.039 0.230 0.770 0.000 0.000 0.770 
Private Passenger AL 1 1.00 0.209 0.011 0.045 0.265 0.734 0.001 0.000 0.735 '-0 
General Liability 5 1.00 0.262 0.013 0.057 0.332 0.668 0.002 0.000 0.668 s::: ~ 
Fire 9 1.00 0.340 0.006 0.095 0.441 0.552 0.006 0.003 0.559 :::s ~ 
Medical Malpractice 11 1.00 0.356 0.070 0.088 0.514 0.482 0.007 0.000 0.486 0 ~ 
Commercial MPL 8 1.00 0.450 0.011 0.124 0.585 0.404 0.011 0.000 0.415 :t>-<"'I 
Workers Compensation 1.00 0.446 0.008 0.128 0.582 0.410 0.004 0.004 0.418 
.... 
3 s::: >:l 
Commercial MP 7 1.00 0.560 0.009 0.156 0.725 0.261 0.014 0.000 0.275 ~ ~ 
Allied 12 1.00 0.545 0.010 0.142 0.697 0.288 0.010 0.005 0.303 "\J 
Commercial AL 6 1.00 0.504 0.000 0.179 0.683 0.290 0.014 0.007 0.317 s:; <"'I 
Commercial APD 10 1.00 0.531 0.000 0.203 0.734 0.242 0.016 0.008 0.266 .... ;:;. 
~C1:) 
Notes: APD = Auto Physical Damage, Ai = Auto Liability, MPL = Multiple Peril (Liability), MP = Multiple Peril. ~ 
~ 
I\.J 
0 
0 
0 
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Table 7 shows general increases in the between-set proportions and 
simultaneous decreases in the within-set proportions as one moves 
from the largest CY2 = 8.60 to the smallest Cy2 = 1.28 with corre-
sponding between-set proportions increasing from 0.233 to 0.734 and 
corresponding within-set proportions declining from 0.767 to 0.266. 
This suggests that among the major lines of the insurance industry, 
the effects of within-set concentration are highest among the largest 
20 affiliates as observed under Set 1 in Tables 6 and 7. In either case, 
as observed in Tables 6 and 7, the biggest contributors to between-sets 
and within-sets components of Cy2 are the largest 20 affiliates (Set 1). 
Inspection of equation (16) indicates that in computing CY2 and its 
decomposition the between-set concentration is due to the presence of 
heterogeneous sets that have mean premiums written that differ from 
the overall 100 affiliates' mean. The contribution of each set to the 
variance is weighted by its respective share of the sample. For Set 1 
the weight is 20/100; for Set 2 the weight is 30/100; and for Set 3 the 
weight is 50/100. 
The within-set concentration, on the other hand, is due to the aggre-
gate contribution to CY2 within each of the three groups, again weighted 
by their respective shares. Thus, for the between-set concentration 
case, the mean premiums written by the largest 20 affiliates differ con-
Siderably from the overall mean. For the within-set concentration, the 
premium written by the largest affiliates among the 20 affiliates differ 
significantly from the mean premiums written of their own group. 
Using the relationship between the squared coefficient of variation 
CY2 and the Herfindahl index provided in equation (17), the test statistic 
for testing the equality of two variances, F*, is helpful. The procedure 
is to align the Cy2 values from Table 6 in ascending order and to use 
equation (20) to test for statistical significance of the F* ratio. The re-
sults are compared with the tabular F* for the five percent significance 
level, which for large samples equals approximately 1.35. 
The first two rows of Table 8 show the arrangement in ascending or-
der and the corresponding line codes. The entries in columns 3 through 
14 represent the F* ratios for all possible comparisons of two specific 
lines. An asterisk (*) in the matrix indicates there is no significance 
between the two lines. For example, the * in column 3 indicates that 
there is not a significant difference in the concentration of the home-
owners and the private passenger auto physical damage lines. All other 
comparisons with the homeowners line (rest of column 3) show a sig-
nificant difference. The complete matrix indicates that in the majority 
of cases there are noticeable differences in concentration among the 
different lines. 
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5 Closing Comments 
A large body of literature pertaining to aggregate concentration de-
scribes, depending on the economic philosophy of the researchers, the 
adverse or beneficial consequences of increasing aggregate concentra-
tion. Some argue that firms that practice in markets characterized by 
high levels of concentration will likely exhibit tacit or collusive behav-
ior, providing these firms with monopoly profits. Others argue that the 
greater efficiency of the leading firms leads to greater concentration 
and, thus, a positive relation between concentration and profitability 
is a result of efficiency rather than monopolization. In the majority of 
cases, however, government agencies concerned with promoting com-
petition among firms in an industry treat increases in concentration 
with disfavor. Government fears that concentration will result in lessen-
ing of competition and enhancement of corporate and political power, 
both of which can be detrimental to the interests of consumers. 
While the property and liability insurance industry is relatively ex-
empt from federal laws through help from the McCarren-Ferguson Act 
of 1945, the act is blamed as being the cause of a variety of problems 
faced by that same industry (Joskow and McLaughlin 1991). There are 
calls for the repeal of the act making the industry subject to antitrust 
rules because of the perceived excessive control of the industry by a few 
large firms. Therefore, research into the level of concentration by line 
of insurance for property and liability is useful in pointing out those 
lines with the largest concentration. 
This paper extends the previous literature in two ways. First, the 
paper updates the previous findings. Second, it provides finer statisti-
cal tools and testing procedures to compute the level of concentration 
by the line of insurance and to identify the lines that are most concen-
trated. 
In this regard, the paper shows that there was an increase in concen-
tration (sometimes sizable) between 1989 and 1995 for almost all the 
lines of property and liability insurance. A plausible explanation is the 
extensive acquisition of firms by other firms, a phenomenon that has 
prevailed throughout U.S. industries in recent years. The second imp or-
tantresult of this research is an ordering of the various lines of property 
and liability insurance by their degree of concentration as shown in the 
matrix of Table 8. One notices here that the most concentrated is the 
homeowners line, followed closely by private passenger auto physical 
damage. 
Table 8 
F-ratios for Testing Hypothesis of Equality of Herfindahl Index for Premium 
Written by Top 100 Affiliates of Property and liability Insurance 
Code 
4 2 1 5 9 11 8 3 7 12 6 10 
Line Code 8.60 8.44 7.36 6.30 3.15 2.84 2.82 2.51 2.18 1.98 1.45 1.28 
HOME 4 1.000 
PPAPD 2 1.019* 1.000 
PPAL 1 1.168 1.147* 1.000 
GENLB 5 1.365 1.340* 1.168 1.000 
Fire 9 2.730 2.679 2.337 2.000 1.000 
MEDMP 11 3.028 2.972 2.592 2.218 1.109* 1.000 
CMLPL 8 3.050 2.993 2.610 2.234 1.117* 1.007* 1.000 
WORKC 3 3.426 3.363 2.932 2.510 1.255* 1.131 * 1.124* 1.000 
CMLP 7 3.945 3.872 3.376 2.890 1.445 1.303* 1.294* 1.151* 1.000 
Allied 12 4.343 4.263 3.717 3.182 1.591 1.434 1.424 1.268* 1.101* 1.000 
CMAL 6 5.931 5.821 5.076 4.345 2.172 1.959 1.945 1.731 1.503 1.366 1.000 
CMAPD 10 6.719 6.594 5.750 4.922 2.461 2.219 2.203 1.961 1.703 1.547 1.133* 1.000 
Source: NAIC (1998) and calculations by equation (5). Notes: HOME = Homeowners, PPAPD = Private Passenger Auto Physical Damage, 
PPAL = Private Passenger Auto Liability, GENLB = General Liability, MEDMP = Medical Malpractice, CMLPL = Commercial Multiple Peril 
(Liability), WORKC = Workers Compensation, CMLP = Commercial Multiple Peril, CMAL = Commercial Auto Liability, CMAPD = Commer-
cial Auto Physical Damage. A superscripted * indicates no statistical significance in concentration between the corresponding pairs of 
insurance lines at 5% level. 
<: t::;. 
'" I:l ~ 
I:l 
~ 
I:l.. 
Q 
~ 
~ 
':"; 
o 
~ 
C"\ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
... 
o· 
~ 
s· 
"\:l 
.g 
~ 
.". 
... 
" ~ 
I"-!S. 
~ 
::::.: 
;;: 
" l"-s· 
~ 
'" 
...... 
...... 
...... 
112 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 8, 2000 
The above two conclusions present a picture of the property and 
liability insurance industry as being highly concentrated. Concentra-
tion alone does not preclude competitiveness, however, as observed 
by Joskow and McLaughlin (1991). They claim that most major lines 
of property and liability insurance are provided by a large number of 
firms; that firms can add any line they choose as part of their business, 
implying no monopolization exists by any of the lines; that entry and 
exit of firms are relatively easy; and that many commercial customers 
may opt to purchase insurance from other established firms. In addi-
tion, self-insurance and the availability of industry insurance groups 
are other alternatives. These factors may combine to exert pressure on 
the industry to be competitive. 
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